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I. INTRODUCTION
The dialogue about Multidisciplinary Practice ("MDP") continues to
escalate. Lawyers and accountants are at the forefront of this debate. In
order to promote greater awareness of the issues involved, this article
discusses MDP and its potential impact on the legal profession and the
consumer. MDP will "enable lawyers to share fees with nonlawyers;
nonlawyers to become partners in law firms; and lawyers who work in
accounting and consulting firms that aren't law firms (such as
accounting firms and consulting firms) to hold themselves out as
practicing law, which they can't do today."' First, this article tracks the
development of MDP. 2 Second, this article looks at arguments
supporting MDP,3 as well as arguments opposing MDP.4 Third, this
article analyzes United States v. Arthur Young & Co. 5 and other case
law as an instructive tool in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of
MDP. Fourth, this article addresses the foreign dialogue and other
factors affecting MDP. 6 Finally, this article concludes that the concept
of MDP is objectionable and consumer protection should be the
7
cornerstone of the decision not to sanction MDP mergers.
The practice of law encompasses many areas that are constantly
litigated to resolve conflicts of interest. 8 In addition, an attorney may
become entangled in situations where the client or putative client's
interests or confidential information may be compromised. The Model
1. Robert Pack, Lawyers, Nonlawyers and the Future of the Practiceof Law, WASH. LAW.,
Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 25; see also A.B.A. Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the
House of Delegates (Aug. 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html
[hereinafter MultidisciplinaryPracticeReport]. The report states that MDP is:
a partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that includes
lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal
services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as
providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services.
Id.
2. Infra notes 10-39 and accompanying text (discussing the development of MDP).
3. Infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the arguments in support of MDP).
4. Infra Part H.B.2 (discussing the arguments opposing MDP).
5. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984); see also infra notes 139-63
(examining the rejection by the Supreme Court of an accountant work product doctrine as
compared to its acceptance of an attorney work product doctrine).
6. Infra Part IV (discussing foreign and other factors affecting the MDP debate).
7. Infra Part V (concluding that MDP should not be sanctioned because it would adversely
impact the core values of the legal profession).
8. See, e.g., Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (holding that presumption that former members of a law firm representing the plaintiff had
shared client confidences was conclusive under California law and precluded the firm from later
representing the plaintiff in patent infringement action against an ex-client).
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Rules of Professional Conduct are sometimes ineffective in solving
these problems because of the difficulty of policing certain types of
behavior. Realistically, the legal profession should realize that these

types of conflicts of interest are practically insurmountable for both
attorneys and accountants. 9 MDPs allow accountant-attorneys to create
entities that present monitoring problems that inherently involve
conflict-ridden opportunities. However, MDPs may represent the future
of the profession if the legal community and its regulating bodies
continue to encourage this type of behavior. With this in mind, the legal
community and its regulating bodies might be better off refusing to
sanction MDPs.

II. MDP DEVELOPMENT
As early as the 1990s, the Big Six Io accounting firms have practiced
law in Europe."
Nevertheless, the question remains, should the
American Bar Association ("ABA") allow the European model to
invade the United States because of the pull the European market has on
U.S. accounting firms?
Smaller accounting firms, investment advisers, and banks are also
moving into territory that has, to date, been beyond their traditionally
fixed lines of demarcation.12 Further, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") purports to have jurisdiction over these
professions by way of international trade aspects of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"). 13 The WTO's new powers will extend to many
areas not previously covered, specifically trade in services.14 The WTO

9. John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 42, 47.
10. Until fairly recently, there were six accounting firms. Id. at 44. These firms were: Arthur
Andersen, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG Peat Marwick, Coopers & Lybrand and
Price Waterhouse. However, in July 1998, Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse to
create PricewaterhouseCoopers. Matthew Goldstein, Accounting Firm Hits the Right Number:
Price Waterhouse Coopers Merges Without Turmoil; Economy Helps, CRAINS'S N.Y. Bus., May
31, 1999, at 16. Thus, the Big Six has become the Big Five. Id.
I1. Gibeaut, supra note 9, at 42 (highlighting the future impact the Big Six and other
accounting giants will have on lawyers). "Unlike nearly every U.S. jurisdiction-the District of
Columbia being the lone exception-most European countries either allow accounting firms to
engage in law practice themselves or to affiliate with law firms." Id. at 44. Furthermore, all
major accounting firms have significant legal practices, often employing hundreds of lawyers
throughout Europe. Id. "Indeed, in some markets [accounting firms] are among the largest
providers of legal services for businesses." Id.
12. Id. at 43; see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 35 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq.
(2000).
13. Gibeaut, supra note 9, at 44.
14. Patricia Isela Hansen, The Impact of the WTO & NAFTA on U.S. Law, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC.
569, 570 (1996) (citing WTO Charter, art. II).
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will now allow more domestic laws to fall within its purview.' 5 "These
new rules are a two-edged sword: while they will likely enable the
United States successfully to challenge foreign laws that harm U.S.
exports, they may also be used to attack our own domestic laws and
regulations."' 6 Since the new WTO rules include trade in services, the
legal profession may be impacted. As a result of these changes, the
entire MDP area may be revamped in accordance with the European or
international model. Globalization of business generally draws
professionals to cooperative business solutions in order to lower costs
and increase efficiency. 17
A. The American BarAssociation's Examination of MDPs
In 1995, the ABA Commission on Nonlawyer Practice released its
much-anticipated report which acknowledged the growing role of
nonlawyers in providing legal services in the United States.18 The
Commission's report listed the following as areas in need of regulation:
consumer protection laws, unfair or deceptive trade practice statutes,
fraud and negligence rules, intensive regulation via registration, and
certification or licensing if it were impossible to achieve acceptably low
19
levels of harm to consumers without such regulatory approaches.
After expressing initial reservations with MDP, the ABA, at least
temporarily, shifted its position. In June 1999, a 12-member ABA
Commission on MDP ("ABA MDP Commission") unanimously
recommended that lawyers be allowed to form partnerships and share
fees with accountants, personal investigators, engineers, consultants and
others. 20 In other words, the ABA MDP Commission recommended
that rules should be promulgated to allow MDPs.
These
recommendations were placed on hold pending additional research on
the matter. 21 On July 11, 2000, after further research had been
22
conducted, the ABA voted against rules that would allow MDPs.
However, this vote has not ended the MDP debate. 23 Rather, in the

15. Id.
16. Id. at 578.
17. Ann L. MacNaughton, MultidisciplinaryPractice: Strategic Response to Transformation
of Global Business Reality, CORP. COUNS. REV. 59, 63 (2000).
18. James Podgers, Regulating Nonlawyers, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 1995, at 103.
19. Id.
20. Pack, supra note 1, at 25.
21. Id. at 26.
22. John Gibeaut, It's A Done Deal, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 92, 92-93 (discussing the ABA
action and the fact that lawyers "have not heard the last word" on the issue).
23. Id.
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future, each individual state will likely be faced with the decision
whether to allow MDPs. Any further consideration of MDP is likely to
start by reviewing the ABA MDP Commission's findings and
recommendations as well as examining the overall ABA vote against
MDPs.
The ABA MDP Commission realized that the current rules do not
offer the protection or the policing that would be necessary to protect
clients if MDP were allowed. To lay the foundation for development,
the ABA Commission proposed five restrictions and precautions to
protect clients.
1) Assurances by a multidisciplinary practice that it will not interfere
with a lawyer's independent professional judgment and that it
recognizes a lawyer's role as an officer of the legal system, including
the ethical obligations to do pro bono work.24
This author believes that this is an inadequate approach to ensure that
clients are protected. The question would become whether the ABA or
the state bar associations are going to have jurisdiction over
multimillion dollar corporations that do not hold licenses to practice
law. Further, what real incentive is the head of a large corporation
25
going to have to protect the attorney's professional obligations?
by nonlawyers to use that as a
2) Forbidding lawyers supervised 26
rules.
conduct
of
violations
to
defense
This mandate forces the lawyer to either turn his face to wrongdoing
or resign his potentially lucrative position in an entity where he is no
longer the decision maker.
27
3) Prohibiting outside investors from owning interest in MDPs.
If the big accounting firms continue to take the lead in acquiring or
backing law firms, this prohibition may be extremely unimportant
considering the wealth base that large accounting firms bring to the
MDP framework.
4) Requiring lawyers to caution clients that attorney-client privilege
may not apply to communications with nonlawyer firm members
providing different kinds of services. Failure to adequately explain
the difference between
legal and nonlegal services could result in
28
disciplinary action.
24. John Gibeaut, Share The Wealth, A.B.A. J., July 1999, at 14, 16 (discussing the ABA's
proposal to allow attorneys to split fees with other professions).
25. Cindy Alberts Carson, Under New Mismanagement: The Problem of Non-lawyer Equity
Partnershipin Law Firms, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593, 611-13 (1994).
26. Gibeaut, supra note 24, at 16.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Here, the attorney's independence has been severely hampered, yet
he has the duty to act as a shield in all aspects of the business venture.
This places a greater onus and responsibility on the attorney; moreover,
it also places the actual policing on the attorney's shoulders. Presently,
attorneys who practice in law firms are allowed to disclose client
information to other firm members unless specifically told not to do so
by the client. "It is reasonable to presume that members of a law firm
freely share their client's confidences with one another." 29 Further, this
restriction fails to recognize that sharing information among
professional colleagues, especially lawyers, is generally accepted
practice. This common practice becomes more difficult when an
attorney's colleague or supervisor may not be an attorney. In the past,
an attorney's supervisor, usually himself an attorney, would also have to
conform to the profession's standards.
and nonlegal-as the
5) Treatment of all the practice's clients-legal
30
lawyer's own for conflict-of-interest analysis.
This restriction places the onus on the client to remember which part
of the organization is on the legal, as opposed to the accounting, side of
the house, especially in light of the fourth restriction's mandate that the
attorney explain the difference between legal and nonlegal services to
the client.
The ABA MDP Commission's recommendation represented a
complete reversal in the ABA's long-standing ban on fee sharing and
blended services. 3 1 The legal community should look to current
independence standards and realize that the lawyers are not meeting the
minimums as an independent profession today even without MDPs.
Mergers with other professions may dilute the goals and aspirations of
an independent legal profession even more.
For example, the 1997-98 ABA President, Jerome J. Shestack,
stressed six basic elements of professionalism: "ethics and integrity,
competence combined with independence, meaningful continuing
learning, civility, obligations to the justice system, and pro bono

29. Novo Terapeutisk Lab., A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 607 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir.
1979) (concerning an appeal where a corporate defendant attempted to disqualify plaintiff's
attorney on grounds that defendant's attorney had at one time been a partner of the same law firm
whose attorneys were representing plaintiff).
30. Gibeaut, supra note 24, at 16 (discussing the ABA's proposal to allow attorneys and other
professions to split fees); see also Multidisciplinary Practice Report, supra note I (summarizing
the Commission's report on MDP and recommending that the ABA adopt MDP because "there is
an interest by clients in the option to select and use lawyers who deliver legal services as part of a
multidisciplinary practice .... ").
31. John Gibeaut, Practice Debate Heats Up, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 14, 16.
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service." 32 More importantly, the president recognized that the ABA
Model Rules seemingly create minimum standards and unfortunately
people decide how far they can push the envelope without actually
violating the rules. 33 "Ethical standards should not be treated as articles
of containment but embraced as welcome moral principles guiding a
growing, vibrant profession. They should lead a lawyer to adhere to
standards of practice that are more high-minded and exacting than the
34
rules require."
Furthermore, MDP would create additional obstacles. Change is
prevalent throughout the business community. Accountants do not have
the threat of jeopardizing a law license. "[T]he increasing globalization
of business, competition from non-traditional sources and the increasing
sophistication of the consumers of legal service" 35 all have an impact on
the law. In the 1970s, law practice was static and in its infancy. From
the 1970s through the 1990s, the law business became a highly
competitive 130 billion dollar industry. 36 This is a result of mergers,
lateral hires, and expansion into the foreign market.37 Likewise, the
accountancy profession has also gone through many changes. Over 100
years ago, the accounting profession invented itself to serve the
country's industrial interests; it continues this trend38 as the business
sector changes, adding new services and competencies.
These changes are often driven by concerns that do not always
encompass the client's best interests. Projections about MDP include
the absolute need to move in a direction where the client's best interests
may be compromised. "One-stop shopping to clients for multiple
business services will become necessary to compete with accounting

32. Jerome J. Shestack, Taking Professionalism Seriously, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 70.
33. Id. at 72; see also CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 29 (1947) (attorneys "should strive
at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not
only the law but the administration of justice").
34. Shestack, supra note 32, at 72; see also CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Preamble (1947)
(articulating that the canons of ethics are adopted "as a general guide, yet the enumeration of
particular duties should not be construed as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative,
though not specifically mentioned").
35. Michael M. Boone & Terry W. Conner, Into the New Millenium: Change, Change, and
More Change: The Challenge Facing Law Firms, 63 TEX. B.J. 18, 19 (2000) (tracking changes in
the legal profession from the pre-1970s to the present).
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id.
38. Anita Dennis, No One Stands Still in PublicAccounting, J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, June 2000,
at 66, 67-74 (tracking changes in the accounting profession from the 1900s to 2000).
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firms and other service providers as they expand more into the legal
39
markets."
B. The Two Sides of the MDP Question
1. Support for MDP
The so-called "one-stop shop," where you can find your lawyer,
accountant, and consultant under one roof,n° is the mantra for MDP
supporters. Many argue that lawyers have already practiced with others
in quasi-MDP situations. For example, lawyers are currently allowed to
retain professional services on a contract basis in the areas of jury
consultants, investigators, and economic analysts. 4 1 MDP supporters
argue that:
In the end, lawyers will not be run out of town by the accounting
firms, but will have to adapt to those changes in the world that are
driving multidisciplinary practice: the information revolution, client
autonomy, a competitive unregulated marketplace, and ambiguity
about the limits of lawyers' professional autonomy. Those who
confront these trends in creative and positive ways will thrive, while
those who stick
their heads in the sand will find themselves clientless
42
and jobless.
William C. Cobb, a Houston consultant, believes that lawyers think
along very narrow lines and, as a result, MDP is going to surpass the
type of service that attorneys have traditionally offered. He suggests
that people are only interested in having their problems solved, and a
lawyer's ability to quote a certain regulation is not solving the
problem. 43 Also, value is added when professionals and organizations
can both solve problems and manage resources. More importantly,
44
Cobb notes, "the problem cannot be solved in a singular product."

39. Boone & Conner, supra note 35, at 24; see also MultidisciplinaryPracticeReport, supra
note 1,app. C (recommending that it is in the public's best interests to permit fee sharing and
partnership and other associations with nonlawyers; therefore, it is in the best interests of the
public that clients be given the opportunity to purchase legal services from an MDP).
40. Pack, supra note 1, at 31.
41. Gary A. Munneke, Can Lawyers Live With MultidisciplinaryPractice?,CORP. COUNS.
REv., Feb. 2000, at 89, 91 (discussing further a lawyer's ability to enter into an ancillary nonlegal
business, which would be consistent with Model Rule 5.7).
42. Id. at 92.
43. A Roundtable Discussionon MultidisciplinaryPractice, HOUS. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at
9, 10 [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion].
44. Id.
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Mike Richter, 45 another consultant, observed that MDP has already
started: "H&R Block, you might know, has a high-level division that's
buying accounting firms to compete with American Express; and there
is another public company out there called Century Business Systems
that is also doing the same thing. So the consolidation process has
started." 46 These comments illustrate the so-called "inevitability of
MDP."
Additionally, proponents of MDP argue that opposition is unfounded
because Model Rules 5.347 and 5.448 will continue to sufficiently protect
client confidences and secrets from unauthorized disclosure. 49 A
comparison has been made to the denial of boards of directors from
having access to certain corporate records. Likewise, the confidentiality
wall surrounding attorney-client relationships would also continue to
prevent nonlawyer owners and managers from having total control of
50
the business.
MDP proponents also believe that "lawyer-nonlawyer ventures
present no dangers that justify an absolute ban." 5 1 One concession is to
mandate that practicing lawyers maintain a controlling interest in the
business. 52 Other supporters argue that empirical data does not show

45. Mr. Richter is a shareholder of Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp, P.C., a leading Houstonbased financial services and business consulting firm. Id.
46. Id.
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (1983). Rule 5.3 states: "(a) a partner in a law
firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with professional obligations of the lawyer";
and (b) lawyers with "direct supervisory authority over [a] nonlawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure [compatible conduct]."
48. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983). Rule 5.4 states:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that ....
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of
the partnership consist of the practice of law ....
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or
association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein ....
Id.; see also MultidisciplinaryPractice Report, supra note I (recommending that a lawyer should
be permitted to share legal fees with a nonlawyer and the lawyer should be permitted to deliver
legal services through MDP).
49. Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals Deserve a
Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 383, 406 (1988) (chronicling the history of the Kutak proposal
and the Jordan Commission Draft which laid the foundation for the possibility of nonlawyerlawyer partnership arrangements).
50. Id.
51. Id.at410.
52. Id. at 409.
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the potential harm that would be realized if the prohibition of
nonlawyers' involvement was lifted.53 This particular argument may
have merit; nevertheless, even though "the book hasn't been written yet
on whether clients in MDPs are really going to get better service or
54
more economical service than they would get from law firms,"
proponents need to acknowledge that:
[T]he moral here is the danger of letting a large amount of money into
the legal system where the people with the money do not feel bound
by the same constraints that lawyers are bound by ....[W]e need to
take that as sort of a precedent, a danger to be looked out for, as we go
down this road.55
Proponents further argue that the current ethical and legal rules can
protect the public, and if the rules are proved
inadequate, then
56
amendments to the rules are an appropriate solution.
Proponents argue that the potential benefits to clients include the
MDP's ability to see, and often solve, the nonlegal aspects of a client's
problem. Whereas, proponents argue, the attorney practicing alone,
even if he is aware of such nonlegal problems, may try to solve the
57
nonlegal problems himself, without sufficient training or experience.
MDP proponents urge lawyers to defer to the expertise of accounting
professionals in finding solutions to a client's accounting issues.
Additionally, the required services would be provided more efficiently
and economically because the client would not need to find and work
with two or more unrelated firms.5 8 MDP got a "shot in the arm" when
the ABA MDP Commission concluded that there is a client interest in
having the option to select and use lawyers who deliver legal services as

53. Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the
Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 621-22 (1989) (discussing the content and
history of rules prohibiting nonlawyers from joining together in business partnerships); see also
infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (discussing FCPA).
54. Roundtable Discussion,supra note 43, at 14 (including comments made by Prof. Robert
Schewerk, a professor of law at the University of Houston Law Center, who has taught and
written in the area of professional responsibility and has served as an assistant reporter on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Committee of the State Bar of Texas, which authored the
current Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct).
55. Id.at 15.
56. Andrews, supra note 53, at 622.
57. Id. at 622-23.
58. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.8(c)(1)-(5) (Proposed ABA
Amendment 1999) (allowing nonlawyers to control MDPs).
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part of an MDP. 59 Thus, clients would have the opportunity for "one6
stop" shopping. 0
One of the stronger arguments is that the rules prohibiting mergers
"owe their surprising tenacity more to the fact that they serve the
61
profession's economic self-interest than to any valid public purpose."
Others suggest that the legal profession is a monopoly; therefore, the
government, through the Federal Trade Commission or Congress,
should displace the monopoly. Federal regulation would provide an
immediate unified rule that comports with antitrust laws that apply to
other business activities. 62 Recent suggestions about the current
system's illegitimacy, monopoly status, and the system's protections
have merit. As a result, many view the current legal system as the
"ultimate monopoly," which definitely does not need the enticements
that MDP would certainly introduce.
2. Opposition and Skepticism Regarding MDP
The legal profession has offered the most resistance against adopting
the MDP model. Opponents suggest that fee splitting would not only
jeopardize attorneys' independence but would also severely
compromise the unique attorney-client privilege. 63 Attorneys cite to
"core values," such as loyalty to the client, independent judgment,
conflicts of interest, and giving conflict-free advice as serious reasons to
6 Differing standards of confidentiality between lawyers
eschew MDP.
and accountants imposes an inherent conflict of interests. Under the
Model Rules, when an attorney is aware of a client's wrongdoing, the

59. Multidisciplinary PracticeReport, supra note I (stressing that the Commission is not
recommending that nonlawyers be able to deliver legal service; rather, lawyers should be
permitted to practice in a wider variety of settings than is currently permitted by Model Rule 5.4).
60. Id. app. A; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.8(a) (Proposed ABA Amendment
1999). This rule indicates:
[a] lawyer shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer or form a partnership or other
entity with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership or other entity
consists of the practice of law except that a lawyer in an MDP controlled by lawyers
may do so, subject to the present provisions limiting holding of equity investments in
any entity or organization providing legal services. A lawyer in an MDP not controlled
by lawyers may do so, subject to the conditions set forth in paragraphs (c)(l)-(5)....
Id.
61. Andrews, supra note 53, at 655.
62. Id. at 655-56.
63. Randy Myers, Lawyers and CPAs: How the Landscape is Changing, J. OF ACCT., Feb.
2000, at 73, 74. The ABA and fifty states currently prohibit lawyers from sharing fees with
nonlawyers, such as accountants; thus, MDPs are currently prohibited. Id.
64. Pack, supra note 1, at 26-27.
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attorney must keep it confidential, 65 whereas the accountant is required
to disclose the same facts. 66 This distinction is critical to the evaluation
and should not be taken lightly. The legal profession has met many
challenges, but the consumer should not suffer in order to accomplish
the espoused inevitable "MDP." Consumer protection has been and
must continue to be the legal profession's paramount goal.
a. The Economic "Push"
"The legal profession exists in a bio-economic world where every
other entity will affect the approach the legal industry must take in
adapting to change and become more effective in solving client
problems in a multi-disciplined way." 67 Nevertheless, like the
economic pull, this trend should not lead to the creation of large
accountant-attorney monopolies. One author has hypothesized that
service professions go through a seven-phase process in their efforts to
compete. 68 The monopoly phase is the first. 69 The profession creates a
market with only one possible supplier or where that supplier is
protected by barriers prohibiting other entries. 70 Simarily, MDP is a
merger of different disciplines into large one-stop shops, that would
eventually result in a monopoly, based partly on economic prowess.
One paradox of the market economy is that it drives actors to neutralize
competition.7 1

65. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1992).
66. Pack, supra note 1, at 27; see also infra notes 139-63 and accompanying text (discussing
the lack of accountant-client privilege).
67. William C. Cobb, Passages:A New World for the Legal Profession:Are Lawyers Sailing
into the Same Storm as their PredecessorProfession?,CORP. COUNS. REV. 77, 78 (2000).
68. Id. at 78-79.
69. Id. at 78.
70. Id. at 79; Gary J. Colbert & Dennis Murray, An Assessment of Recent Changes in the
Uniform Accountancy Act, 13 ACCT. HORIZONS 54, 65 (1999). The article highlights that:
[T]he primary beneficiary of occupational licensing might not be consumers, but
members of the occupation. Members of a profession will usually be more affected by
occupational regulations than would consumers. Accordingly, the professionals have a
greater incentive to undertake actions that will enhance the likelihood of securing
regulations favorable to the profession. In other words, those who are regulated
"capture" the regulators. Members of a profession would favor regulations that restrict
entry. Stricter regulations would reduce competition and existing members would
enjoy monopoly returns.
Colbert & Murray, supra, at 65.
71. Richard L. Abel, Revisioning Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 1
(Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995). The essays expound on changes in the legal
profession-assessing the market control theory, competition, comparative sociology, and the
independence aspects of the profession. Id.
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The other phases are: second, the drive toward "increasing capacity
to meet growing demand"; Phase III, "the use of an established
distribution channel to pursue market share expansion"; Phase IV, "the
shift in power from the seller to the buyer or increasing customer
sophistication"; Phase V, "the reactionary response to forces not
understood by the provider"; Phase VI, "the quest for the 'holy grail' or
'silver bullet' to solve the emerging problems without having to make
significant shifts in the culture and the vision of the organization-the
easy way out"; and, lastly, Phase VII "the recognition of the need for
leadership and vision required to adapt."-72 William Cobb highlights
this seventh and last phase as the position the legal profession is
actually in at this particular juncture in its development.7 3
The
profession will continue to solve its clients' problems and develop
mechanisms to "add value to the clients." 74 In other words, firms will
evolve into "true partnerships" that are truly interested in collaborations
and clients' needs, coupled with the move toward investing in its
employees so that they serve the clients responsively. 75 The bottom line
will be the recognition of professionalism and the professionals and not
billable hours. 76 This cannot be accomplished if the bottom line is
allowed to erode the profession's duties and responsibilities to the
client.
Therefore, failure to protect client confidences violates professional
conduct rules and results in loss of attorney-client and work product
privileges. 77 The problem, doubtless, will increase if nonlawyers are

72. Cobb, supra note 67, at 78-79.
73. Id. at 87.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 87; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.8(c)(1)-(5) (Amendment Proposed by
the ABA 1999).
77. Kirk R. Hall, Not So Well-Kept Secrets, A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 85; see also ANN. MODEL
RULES PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 5; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
These rules state:
The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the
attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of
evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The
attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer
may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a
client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those
where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The
confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the
client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A
lawyer may not disclose such information ....

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 32

allowed to practice law or control lawyers' decisions; the privileges will
be severely diluted. Currently, "a lawyer shall not form a partnership
with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consists of
78
the practice of law."
b. The "Medical MDP" and its Effect on Doctors
Jennifer James, a former professor at the University of Washington,
compared similarities between doctors and lawyers and recognized that
"doctors have lost more power in recent years than any profession in
history." She warns that "it could even be worse for lawyers unless
they 'start thinking on the edge and choose not to be part of the
lodge."' 79 She added that she was "troubled by the thought that lawyers
could lose more power than would be good for society." 80 This
observation is extremely astute because it highlights the concern not
only for the integrity of the legal profession but also the attorney's role
in protecting society as well. It also gives us a model to avoid: the
doctors were faced with the opportunity to expand in money-growth
opportunities but unfortunately failed to realize the long term effects
such partnerships would have on their independence and reputation as
professionals.
The Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge by an unincorporated
association of lawyers, paralegals, and laypersons to the partnership
rule, Model Rule 5.4(b), and the unauthorized practice rule, Model Rule
5.5(b). 8 1 The plaintiffs claimed that the rules are unconstitutional
because they violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Constitution. 82 The court recognized that the rules promote
attorneys' independence because they prevent nonlawyers from

78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (1992); see also MODEL RULES OFPROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.4(d) (1992). Rule 5.4(d) states:
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or
association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of
the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time
during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a
lawyer.
Id.
79. Steven Keeva, Keeping in Front of the Future, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1998, at 81, 82.
80. Id.
81. Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1384 (7th Cir. 1992).
82. Id.
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controlling how lawyers practice their profession. 83 This recognition of
independence in the legal arena is analogous to the physicians'
relationship with HMOs and PPOs, where the actual service provider is
not ultimately responsible for bottom-line decisions. This lack of
independence in the medical profession has an economic impetus;
therefore, the legal profession should pay close attention to what has
happened. Further, the unauthorized practice provisions protect the
public by prohibiting laymen from rendering services that they are not
qualified to render. 84 The public's interest is best served by monitoring
and curtailing attempts to engage in the unauthorized practice of law.
c. Concerns About Gaps and Weaknesses in the Rules of Professional
Conduct
Many lawyers are extremely interested in strengthening the rules of
professional conduct in order to protect clients further. Roger Cramton,
a professor at Cornell Law School, believes the exceptions to the
confidentiality rules should be cleared up. Cramton said the "loophole
in the confidentiality rules, [which allows the attorney to reveal client
confidences if there is a controversy between attorney and client or
other situations concerning the attorney's representation of the client]
.... is an embarrassment to a profession that claims to put the needs of
the public above its own interests." 85
In other words, all
communication should fall within the general rule's purview without
exception.
Lawyers are concerned about problems that are likely to develop.
"When money becomes the primary goal, a law firm may end up
choosing to systematically and deliberately inflate clients bills and even
to bill for expenses not actually incurred for those clients."8 6 When
lawyers are independently performing their jobs, problems erupt. When
clients hear of criminal indictments of prominent lawyers for cheating
and stealing, it eats silently and surreptitiously at the heart and soul of
the profession because it corrodes the public's confidences in the
83. Id. at 1385.
84. Duncan v. Gordon, 476 So.2d 896, 899 (La. 1995) (upholding Louisiana's unauthorized
practice statute when nonlawyer engaged in the practice of law in violation of the statute).
85. Mark Hansen, A Roomful of Comments, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 100 (discussing lawyers'
comments to the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission that suggested ways to strengthen the public's
protection); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1983). Rule 1.6(a) states,
"(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b)." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1983).
86. Seth Rosner, Professionalism and Money, A.B.A. J., May 1992, at 69, 70.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 32

lawyer-client relationship.8 7 Lawyers agonize endlessly about how to
behave. They consider their rules of professional conduct, in selfcongratulatory and ceremonial speeches, while deploring their poor
public "image" and proposing ways to improve it. 88 Lawyers'
independence is extremely important. "It is the job of a good lawyer to
look through the lens of legal [and especially economic] vulnerability
and to caution against anything that may lead to trouble." 89 This is
sound advice when contemplating the pull of the "lucrative carrot" that
MDP offers.
California lawyer Jay Foonberg argues that "lawyers will lose their
loyalty to their clients if they add nonlawyers as partners ....You will
have two fiduciary duties: one to the client and one to the nonlawyer
partner. Who is going to come first?" 90 Foonberg believes that MDPs
are about making money, not client loyalty, and this creates an ethical
land mine. 9 1 Agency law will be invoked when conflicts arise to
determine to whom the lawyer is ultimately responsible. 92 Presently,
this is not a problem because the client is the attorney's primary duty.
Further, the rank and file attorneys have not, in large numbers,
weighed in on the issue. 93 Nevertheless, the large firms' efforts should
not carry the day. Of course, business trends and global factors are
important today, but neither should have the impact of lowering the
standards and reducing safeguards that protect the public in an effort to
accommodate big business, whose primary concern is an economic one.
The New York State Bar Association House of Delegates passed a
resolution against MDP "in the absence of a sufficient demonstration
that such changes are in the best interests of clients and do not
undermine the integrity of the delivery of legal services by the legal
94
profession."
State bar leaders have also expressed concerns that the ABA's broad
definitions of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law do not
87. Id. at 70; see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (articulating that, historically, a
lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while
faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his client).
88. Abel, supra note 71, at 297.
89. Jeffrey L. Seglin, Ethics Requires Revealing the Truth, HOUS. CHRON., May 28, 2000, at
5D.
90. Jill Schachner Chanen, MDP: The View From Main Street, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1999, at 76.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Multidisciplinary Practice Report, supra note 1,app. B, at 1-3 (a review of the list
showed that attorney witnesses testifying at the Hearings represented larger firms-a few were
solo practitioners).
94. Gibeaut, supra note 31, at 14.

2001]

Why Say No to MDP?

go far enough to prevent encroachment by nonlawyers and a
deterioration of attorneys' independence. 9 5 The problem of inadequate
enforcement devices for nonlawyers is also a strong indication against
allowing MDP. 96 The nonlawyer is in a position to reap the benefits of
a well-policed profession. The increased investigations, discipline, and
insurance costs will be paid by the attorney, yet the nonlawyer will not
have to fear that the police powers of the legal regulators will ever touch
him because he is, in fact, beyond its authority. 97 The American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") basically supports
this position. It criticized an ABA plan that would have required MDPs
controlled by nonlawyers or accountants to submit to annual
certification and audit requirements by the courts. 98 Perhaps the only
workable solution to the MDP debate is to allow "[tihose lawyers who
wish to enjoy the benefits of being part of the world of business ... to
change careers [rather] than change the profession." 99 As stated by
Professor Schuwerk, "[t]his whole debate is going to force us to really
examine why we wanted to be lawyers in the first place, what
professional values are really our core values, and what are primarily
financial values ....100
George Soros, a well-known businessman-philanthropist, has not
weighed in specifically on the MDP debate, but he has used his funds to
obtain further accountability in the legal profession.10 1 He believes the
legal profession, like medicine, has veered from its core values and
taken on those of the marketplace, which by definition are amoral with
their bottom-line standards. 10 2 MDP entices lawyers to reach for
economic gain; that is, the marketplace culture has been allowed to

95. Id. at 16.
96. Carson, supra note 25, at 612-13. The harm caused by the non-lawyer's behavior is
compounded by the fact that he may cause it with impunity since he is not subject to discipline.
Even if the harm precipitated by non-lawyers were no greater in magnitude than that caused by
lawyers, it may be greater in frequency given that non-lawyers have no training in legal ethics and
face no disciplinary consequences for their actions. Id.
97. See id. at 613 (discussing the new set of standards).
98. Myers, supra note 63, at 75 (discussing the move toward MDP and the benefits of onestop shopping).
99. Carson, supra note 25, at 633-34.
100. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 43, at 17 (statement of Prof. Schuwerk, a professor of
ethics at the University of Houston Law Center, who has served as an assistant reporter on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Committee of the Texas State Bar).
101. See Terry Carter, Mr. Democracy: Giving More Billions to Further Justice than
Anyone-Ever, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2000, at 57, 59 (discussing Soros's Open Society Institute,
Program on Law and Society, among others, which are charged with bringing about changes in
the U.S. justice system and other related areas).
102. Id.
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compromise independent judgment.10 3 MDP would not only erode this
critical independence, but it would create avoidable situations that
would produce conflicts and greater opportunities to circumvent the
system, which is presently ill-equipped to deal with lawyers that are
bending the ethical rules. Continuing to reject MDP will send the clear
message that by "emphasizing the values of independence we fortify
10 4
ourselves to exercise them."'
Currently, ABA rules place heavy emphasis on supervising
nonlawyer employees. 1°5 Furthermore, many jurisdictions expose
lawyers to disciplinary sanctions as well as civil liability for failure to
provide employees with reasonable supervision and failure to ensure
°6
that their conduct is compatible with the profession's obligations.'
The rules mandate that the attorney shall be responsible for the
recalcitrant employee's conduct. 1°7 Attorneys continue to have great
difficulty complying with the responsibility of supervising nonlawyers,
even without the extra burden of factoring MDP into the equation. One
attorney was given a six-month suspension for relinquishing significant
aspects of his probate practice to a nonlawyer. 10 8 Another attorney
allowed a nonlawyer to sign checks for disbursements from the office
and clients' trust accounts, an action that eventually led to unauthorized
drawing of checks and misrepresentations to clients. 1°9 The attorney
was suspended because the court reasoned that the public had to be
protected. 110
103. Cf. Shestack, supra note 32, at 73.
104. Cf. id.
105. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a) (1983). Rule 5.3(a) states:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible
with the professional obligations of the lawyer.
Id.
106. Walter W. Steele, Jr., Supervision of Non-Lawyer Employees: The Hidden Ethical
Obligation, 58 TEX. B.J. 798, 799 (1995) (chronicling the results, in several states, where lawyers
failed to properly supervise nonlawyers and as a result were disciplined for violating the rules).
107. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c) (1983) (stating that a lawyer
shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if: (1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of
the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in
which the person is employed, or has direct supervising authority over the person, and knows of
the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take
reasonable remedial action).
108. Steele, supra note 106, at 799 (discussing Office of Disciplinary Couns. v. Ball, 618
N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1993)).
109. Id. at 800.
110. Id. at 800 (discussing Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Goldberg, 441 A.2d
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Many of the observations made by James Sales"' succinctly
articulate why MDP is not a good idea. Sales highlights the AICPA's
position, which applauds the ABA MDP Commission's "far-looking
futuristic position" 112 to embrace MDP. Nevertheless, Sales could not
agree with the MDP proposal because: 1) AICPA objects to the
definition of the "practice of law"; 2) it opposes the imposition on the
MDP of any ethical rules regarding conflicts of interest or solicitation;
3) it took issue with the imposition of the Code of Professional Conduct
on an MDP; and, 4) it rejected annual certification or audit by
jurisdictions containing MDP delivery of legal services. AICPA takes
the position "that there [i]s no need for onerous regulatory oversight of
an MDP." 113 This objection to oversight highlights the accounting
profession's desire to reap benefits, but also its refusal to accept the
legal profession's accountability standards. Such resistance casts an
ominous shadow on the accounting profession's commitment to protect
4
the public and maintain professional standards."l
Furthermore, Sales accurately observes that the practice of law is not
governed by consumers. Lawyers are professionals because they are
guided by judicial licensing and oversight imposed by the United States
Supreme Court and individual state bar associations. 115 Only those
entities or their designated representatives enforce the rules governing
the practice of law, and legal guidance and oversight is accomplished
through our disciplinary process. 116 "The rules of professional conduct
117
present a serious problem for adoption of the MDP concept."
In 1996, the ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar identified several reasons for the decline in professionalism within
the profession; 118 two of those reasons explain why the ABA should
338 (Md. 1882)).
111. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 43, at 13. James B. Sales participated in the
Roundtable, and he has headed the Litigation Department of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. for the
past twenty years. He is a past President of the Houston Bar Association and was the first chair
of the Houston Bar Foundation. He also serves as the HBA's delegate to the ABA House of
Delegates.
112. Id. at 13.
113. Id. at 13-14.
114. See AICPA CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT, pmbl. (expressing the profession's recognition
of its responsibilities to the public).
115. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 43, at 14 (statement by Professor Sales regarding the
judiciary's role in maintaining professional standards).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. ABA Sec. of Legal Teaching and Learning Professionalism, A.B.A. Sec. of Legal Educ.
and Admissions to the Bar, Report of the Professionalism Committee, Aug. 1996, at 3 [hereinafter
Teaching and Learning Professionalism] (developing ways to better inculcate a higher sense of
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reject MDP. Presently, the legal profession is failing to meet goals of
professionalism and is ultimately harming the consumer. The
Committee said that:
[C]hanges in the economics of the practice of law.., have converted
law practice from a profession to a business-making it more difficult
for lawyers to devote significant amounts of time to public service
activities and generating a growing sense of dissatisfaction with law
practice ....
This "business" posture that has been adopted by many is indicative of
the fervor that is driving adoption of the MDP model. The MDP
venture is, to date, "an undermining of the traditional independent
counseling role of lawyers." 120 Thus, courts have held that the
unauthorized practice of law is grounded in the public's need for
integrity from the legal profession, and "the unauthorized practice rule
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest,"1 2 1 which is partly
driven by the attorney's independence and recognition as a consummate
professional.
Additionally, the public's image of the legal business has been
severely tarnished. "Lawyers are seen as 'takers' from society, not
'contributors." ' 122 MDP would further contribute to this tarnished
image, especially if multinational MDPs are formed as a result of the
inevitable mergers. Currently, and perhaps rightly so, the perception
that "tax havens protect some interests internationally, so do 'law
havens' protect others who seek international legal anonymity, asset
protection, secrecy and an 'alegal' environment with nearly zero
demands of accountability." 123 This type of real or perceived
clandestine activity is occurring without widespread MDP. What will
happen if a state sanctions such MDP arrangements? The District of
Columbia Bar Association has allowed MDPs since 1991; still, one
124
major limitation exists-attorneys must retain control of such firms.
At this juncture, the biggest employers of attorneys are the Big Five
accounting firms. 125 One of the main concerns is that these firms

professionalism throughout the American legal profession).
119. Id. at 3 (citing Am. Bar Ass'n, The Report of "At a Breaking Point," A National
Conference on the Emerging Crises in The Quality of Lawyers' Health and Lives-Its Impact on
Law Firms and Client Services (1991)).
120. Id.
121. Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1385 (7th Cir. 1992).
122. Boone & Conner, supra note 35, at 24.
123. DAVID J. SAARI, GLOBAL CORPORATIONS AND SOVEREIGN NATIONS 163-64 (1999).
124. Myers, supra note 63, at 75.
125. Id.
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currently "skirt the ABA's prohibition relating to MDPs by contending
that their lawyers don't practice law and don't hold themselves out to
the public as lawyers. In the real world, that boils down to saying they
don't draft legal documents, offer legal advice or represent clients in
court.' ' 126 The perception is that large firms are getting away with "de
facto" MDPs while small firms doing the same would be afraid of being
"drawn and quartered."' 127 The Big Five are international conglomerates
128
that are eager to test the "MDP water" in the United States.
This pushing of the MDP envelope is analogous to American
companies that adopt foreign models of business practices, even though
in reality they do not square with U.S. standards. 29 The Big Five are
international conglomerates that are already operating internationally as
*MDPs. Transnational corporations ("TNC") already benefit from the
notion that the primary focus of international law should be relations
between sovereigns, 30 not protecting private business practices and
concerns.
This narrow view already "allows TNCs to evade
accountability for their actions at the domestic level by shifting
production between different sites. The absence of clear international
standards means that they can also avoid regulation at the international
level."' 13 1 Seventy percent of global trade is controlled by 500
corporations, and one percent of the TNCs own one-half of the total
stock of foreign direct investment. 132 MDPs are sure to have major
capital in order to control the newly established mammoth-sized
attorney-accountant ventures.

126. Id.; see also Multidisciplinary Practice Report, supra note 1, at I (acknowledging that
"an increasing number of U.S. lawyers with significant practice experience are leaving law firms
to join organizations such as the Big [Five] accounting firms that provide a variety of professional
services").
127. Myers, supra note 63, at 75.
128. See Multidisciplinary PracticeReport, supra note 1, app. C, at 4 ("U.S. and foreign
representatives of four out of five of the Big Five testified before the Commission that the most
efficient way to provide a seamless web of services to clients was through an integrated services
entity.").
129. See id. at 4 (articulating that "the Big Five accounting firms and other entities have been
able to create legal services units within their own business organizations or affiliate with foreign
law firms in ways that are inconsistent with rules of lawyer conduct or UPL statutes in this
country" (citing WARD BOWER, MULTIDISCIPLINARY PARTNERSHIPS-THE FUTURE IN GLOBAL

LAW PRACTICE 158-60 (1997))).
130. SAARI, supra note 123, at 164.
131. Id. (quoting Grossman & Brodlow, Are We Being PropelledTowards a People Centered
TransnationalLegal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (1993)).
132. Tony Clark, Mechanisms of Corporate Rule, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN TOWARD THE LOCAL 298 (1996).
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The WTO has made it possible for TNCs and banks to move capital
and services freely throughout the world, unfettered by regulations of
nation-states or elected governments. 133 If MDP is given the "green
light," the United States may have to develop a Foreign Corrupt Legal
Practices Act, similar to the current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA") 134 that causes offenders to incur large monetary fines for its
contravention. The desire to allow American firms to expand via MDP
is actually quite clever. Prior to the passage of the FCPA, U.S.
companies were engaging in activity that may not have been illegal in
the particular country where the activity took place but was illegal in the
United States. Similarly, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 135 and the equivalent rule in state courts, allows U.S. courts
to sanction lawyers for violating certain rules; the rules protect parties
from harassment, misrepresentation, and the like. Doubtless, Rule 11
and its state equivalents will be ineffective as a tool to govern U.S.
attorneys' behavior in international courts because Rule 11 does not
apply to behavior outside of U.S. courtrooms.
MDP runs parallel to the activities to which American businessmen
want the United States to turn a blind eye-pre-FCPA and post-FCPA
business negotiations. Edward M. Graham, an economist, said:
U.S. business executives are particularly galled by the fact that illicit
payments to foreign governments and their agents are essentially
forbidden under the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
whereas certain other advanced countries not only fail to forbid such
payments but in some cases even allow136home-country tax benefits to
offset or partially offset such payments.

133. Id. at 301.
134. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-I (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (as
amended Nov. 10, 1998, Pub. L. 105-366, § 2(a)-(c) 112 Stat. 3302). The FCPA states:
[It] shall be unlawful for any [issuer] ... corruptly, in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money ... giving of anything of
value to any foreign official for purposes of influencing any act or decision of such
foreign official in his official capacity ... in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or
retaining business....
Id.
135. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (outlining that sanctions may be imposed for violation of the
rule.., which may consist of directives of a non-monetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into
court.., and order directing payment to the movant for some or all reasonable attorneys' fees and
other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violations).
136. SAARI, supra note 123, at 221 (discussing corrupt practices in business: "in the United
States, pay-off; in Japan, wairo; in Germany, trinkgelt; in Italy, bustarella; and, in Mexico,
mordida").
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As some have noted, "the FCPA breathes morality."' 3 7 There is a
public interest in business misconduct that is extremely intense and
continues to linger in the United States. 138 MDP decisions must be
evaluated with the highest level of scrutiny; thus, looking at analogous
situations in other disciplines is a key factor, tempered with the public's
protection.
III. WORK PRODUCT IS AND MUST BE LIMITED TO ATTORNEYS

The legal profession is uniquely situated in relation to other
professions. United States v. Arthur Young & Co. 139 is instructive to
those who are seeking to determine MDPs' impact on the legal
profession and the clients that it will ultimately serve. In Arthur Young,
the distinct aspects of lawyers' roles and accountants' roles are
succinctly stated and analyzed. Specifically, respondent Young was the
independent certified public accountant ("CPA") responsible for
auditing Amerada Hess Corporation, as required by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC").' 4° In the regular course of his specific
tasks, Young verified Hess' statement of its contingent tax liability and
prepared the accrual workpapers. 14 1 Later, the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") performed a routine audit of Hess' financial situation and
issued an administrative summons to receive, inter alia, the tax accrual
workpapers. 142 The district court rejected Young's accountant-client
43
privilege argument. 1
Unlike accountancy, however, attorneys' work products are not
discoverable; the work product rule, as articulated in Hickman v.
Taylor,144 is well settled. The work product exception amplifies a
major distinction between the legal profession and the accounting
profession. As the Supreme Court has noted:
Corporate financial statements are one of the primary sources of
information available to guide the decisions of the investing public. In
137. Id. at 222 (quoting RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDAN, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 336-37 (1995)).
138.

Id. at 225 (quoting DAVID VOGEL, KINDRED STRANGERS: THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN POLITICS AND BUSINESS IN AMERICA 103 (1996)).
139. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
140. Id. at 808.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 809.
143. Id. at 809-10. The Court of Appeals drew on Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), to
fashion a work product immunity doctrine, determining that the IRS failed to demonstrate
sufficient need. See id. at 810.
144. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (articulating the attorney work product
exception).
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an effort to control the accuracy of the financial data available to
investors in the securities markets, various provisions of the federal
securities laws require publicly held corporations to file their
financial
145
statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Thus, on the one hand, the well-enforced and highly accepted
attorney work product privilege guards and protects the client's
confidentiality. 14 6 On the other hand, courts and the SEC have taken
steps to protect the consumer and the general public by requiring
accountants to disclose their work products. The combination of these
two concepts is inherently problematic when the work product doctrine
is considered. The public's protection is best afforded by not extending
the work product privilege to accountants and their clients.
Each profession has regulatory schemes that are designed, not only to
protect the integrity of the profession, but also to protect the public at
large. The attorney work product doctrine articulated in Hickman,
established in 1947, is now well accepted. Unlike the Hickman Court,
the Arthur Young Court rejected the premise that accrual workpapers
147
were a fitting analogue to the attorney work product doctrine.
Specifically, the Court rejected the District Court and the Court of
Appeals' determinations that even though the tax accrual workpapers
satisfied the relevance requirement of the statute, they deserved
protection from discovery. 148 In other words, the Supreme Court has
already rejected the argument that an accountant work product doctrine
should exist. 149
Thus, the Court distinguished the attorney's role as confidential
advisor-advocate and loyal representative, with a duty to present his
client's case in the most favorable light, from that of the accountant who
certifies the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's
financial status. The accountant assumes a public responsibility, which
transcends any relationship with the client. This is epitomized by
consumer regulations, mandating that "financial reports must be audited
by an independent certified public accountant in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards,"' 50 a standard intended to protect

145. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 810-11.
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (stating that, except in extremely
limited situations, an attorney shall not reveal information related to representing a client).
147. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817; see also MultidisciplinaryPractice Report, supra note 1,
cmt. 5 (discussing the attorney work product and confidentiality doctrines).
148. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 818.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 811 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1983) (prescribing the qualifications of accountants'
reports that must be submitted with corporate financial statements)).
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the public en masse. The accountant owes special allegiance to the
corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as the investing public.
51
This public "watchdog" function demands total independence. 1
If the courts were to allow insulation, such as accountant work
product protection, it would force accountants to ignore the significance
of their role as disinterested analysts charged with protecting the
public. 152 Unlike attorneys, whose ultimate loyalty is to their private
clients, the accountant owes a "special allegiance" to the investing
public. This "special allegiance" continues to drive courts' evaluations
of accountant-client privilege.
In Marcus Bros. Textiles, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, L.L.P.,' 53 an
auditor argued that he was not liable to a third party because the third
party was not in privity. 154 The party was able to use as evidence an
internal memo, inter alia, that developed certain client-specific
information. 155 Nevertheless, in an attorney-client situation, the
information would be viewed as privileged, and thus protected by the
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. Generally, the
attorney's work product is not subject to a privity argument from a third
party because the attorney only has privity with the individual client,
not with the public or any third party.
In Arthur Young, the auditor had to review many sources to complete
his task. For example, an auditor will typically examine the
corporation's books, records, and tax returns, along with his interviews
with corporate personnel and judgments on the evaluated
information. 156 Nevertheless, the district court and the court of appeals
determined that the tax accrual workpapers satisfied relevance. 157 The
Supreme Court said, correctly, that the courts were misguided in their
efforts to establish a self-styled work product privilege for accountants.
The Court stated that "no confidential accountant-client privilege exists
under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been
recognized."' 158 Unlike attorneys, accountants can be forced to disclose

151. Id. at 818.
152. Id.
153. Marcus Bros. Textiles, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse, L.L.P., 498 S.E.2d 196 (N.C. Ct. App.
1998).
154. Id. at 199 (recognizing that liability of an auditor extends not only to those in privity or
near privity but also to those whom he knows and intends to rely on his opinion or those he
knows his client intends will so rely).
155. Id. at 198.
156. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 812.
157. Id. at 813.
158. Id. at 817 (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)).
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information in court. Thus, lack of privilege is a significant difference
between the legal profession and the accounting profession. This major
distinction must be considered with the highest deference during this
ongoing debate on MDP. Nonetheless, in light of this protection and to
preserve the integrity of the profession, law firms should form
committees that help to monitor the firms' compliance with the ethical
rules' 5 9 because this self-policing will highlight the profession's
commitment to maintaining its "core values."
The attorney-client privilege1 60 is likewise heavily relied on to
protect client matters. An example of the depth of this protection was
profoundly exemplified when the United States Supreme Court held that
communications between a lawyer and a client remain privileged even
after the client's death. 16 1 The Court cited "weighty reasons" 162 in
upholding the posthumous privilege, specifically, the need to encourage
full and frank communications between the attorney and his client. This
holding further supports the rules that prohibit lawyers from revealing
clients' confidences and secrets. 163
IV. FOREIGN AND OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE MDP DEBATE
The new vocabulary for the one-stop shop includes "global" and
"strategic fit," conjuring up a sense of escape from the traditions and
regulations that have so affected lawyers to date. 16 Antonio Garrigues
Walker was a partner at J. & A. Garrigues, one of Spain's biggest law
165
firms, which merged with a global consulting giant a few years ago.

159. Teaching and Learning Professionalism,supra note 118, at 33.
160. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (stating that, except in extremely
limited situations, a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of his client);
CANONS OF PROF'L ETHics Canon 37 (1947). Canon 37 states:
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the
lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees; and neither of them
should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of
these confidences, either for the private advantage of the lawyer or his employees or to
the disadvantage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though
there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue
employment when he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of his full
duty to his former or to his new client.
CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 37 (1947).
161. Steve France, 'Weighty Reasons' For Secrecy, 84 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 44.
162. Id. (citing Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998)).
163. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (asserting that "a lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client").
164. See Keeva, supra note 79, at 81 (chronicling reasons why American attorneys should
embrace change to become part of the so-called "inevitable MDP").
165. Id. at 82.
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Walker warns that even his firm could not fight against the auditing
firms and, as a result, had to merge. 166 Walker asserts that he is
satisfied with the merger and chides Americans that "even big
American law firms aren't global."' 167 International law, accountancy
firm mergers, as well as global capitalism are also major factors that
drive the MDP engine. The changing nature of capitalism is seen
through "cross-cultural management, which is being pressed into
service by joint ventures, foreign subsidiaries and alliances among

corporations."

168

Unfortunately at this time, "international law is not powerful enough
to govern traditional multinational corporations outside their home
state." 169 This failure in the multinational arena should act as a red flag
for the ABA and others to proceed with caution in the MDP area. These
very concerns and issues await MDP if it is allowed to flourish in the
manner that multinationals have flourished.
Domestic firms are not only weighing in on the MDP debate, but are
also taking advantage of the allowance in the District of Columbia
Ethical Rules that allow a "nonlawyer to be a partner in a law firm...
[as long as] any services the nonlawyer renders be in direct support of
the provision of legal services."' 170 Specifically, Ernst & Young has
financed a D.C. law firm, McKee, Nelson, Ernst & Young, which is
basically the merger of an accounting firm and a law firm. The firm has
been described as "the closest thing to a multidisciplinary practice in
this country to date."' 7 1 This venture is not the only one; it follows
recent announcements of the formation by other Big Five firms of
strategic alliances with influential U.S. law firms, 172 including the 1999
KPMG-Morrison & Forester (of San Francisco) merger, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers' alliance with the Washington, D.C. law firm
of Miller Chevalier. 173

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. SAARI, supra note 123, at 82 (developing the changing balance of power between
corporations and public authority in this global economy-"should 185 sovereigns allow 750
giant corporations to invest corporate profits as they alone see fit") (quoting CHARLES HAMPDENTURNER & ALFONS TROMPENAARS, THE SEVEN CULTURES OF CAPITALISM (1993)).

169.
170.
171.
172.
ACCT.
173.

Id. at 163.
Mark Hansen, All Aboard For MDP Train, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2000, at 28.
Id.
Jack Baker, Randall K. Hanson, & James K. Smith, Large Firms Press Ahead, J. OF
76 (Feb. 2000) (discussing the reality of MDP in the United States).
Id.
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Competition is a major force that drives MDP. Accountants and
174
other nontraditional businesses are expanding into the legal field.
Consolidation of law firms will make them bigger and stronger and
additional foreign firms will continue to expand into the American
market. 175 Changes in the Uniform Accountancy Act, which relate to
experience requirements and non-CPA ownership, may also impact the
76
accounting profession's drive to move toward MDP. 1
In Europe, Latin America, and the United States, those with legal
training are increasingly being challenged. Technocrats who are trained
in economics and business (especially accountants), are "numerate,"
"computer literate,"' 177 and highly educated. Specifically, corporate
middle managers in Europe and Latin America are legally trained
because of the undergraduate degree status of the legal profession,
although few complete the additional requisites to actually enter private
practice or enter the magistracy. 178 This academic exposure to the legal
profession provides the business community with highly educated
professionals ready to explore all types of ventures and more likely to
accept MDP because not only do many of their home countries sanction
it, but also because they see the "golden parachute" of opportunities.
This is also true for U.S. CPAs, who continue to show a great deal of
interest in various business ventures, and continue to expand into other
professions. After the CPAs launched a successful lobbying campaign,
forty-one states relaxed their rules and now allow CPAs to accept
commissions and referral fees. 179 Thus, accountants are spreading their
reach deeper into non-traditional professions. Many states, in addition
to allowing fee splitting, also allow accountants to obtain licenses to sell
life insurance. 180 As a result, one-stop shopping is a reality for the
accounting firms.
It is projected that by 2010, some U.S. firms will have over 1,000
attorneys and will offer broad specialized services-local and regional,
as well as national and global. 181 "In the [near] future, successful law
174. Boone & Conner, supra note 35, at 25.
175. Id. at 25.
176. Gary J. Colbert & Dennis Murray, An Assessment of Recent Changes in the Uniform
Accountancy Act, 13 AM. ACCT. ASSOC., at 55-68 (1999) (discussing relaxation of certain
standards-prior UAA requirement of one year public accounting experience under the direction
of a CPA, revised UAA allows the one year experience to be in a broad array of settings and
experience only has to be verified by a CPA).
177. Abel, supra note 71, at 300.
178. Id.
179. Janet Novack, Certified PublicAccomplice, FORBES, Nov. 1999, at 282.
180. Id.
181. Boone & Conner, supra note 35, at 25.
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firms will be those which have real change leaders on their management
team ... people who have the skills for identifying and implementing
change in a manner that breaks down... barriers to change."' 182 The
changing economy generally has led some to speculate that companies
will "try to make money by suing everybody in sight."' 183 In other
words, the law will be used to create greater legal controls and to
weaken consumer welfare. 184 MDP will likely take on the multinational
corporation model and, as a result, will carefully structure and develop
entities in ways that will effectively avoid being regulated or effectively
make it impossible to adequately regulate them. "Multinational
corporations increasingly demand the 'freedom' they need to optimize
their operations across borders."' 185 Presently, the stateless position that
most multinational corporations are experiencing has caused
uneasiness.186 As multinationals continue to "reinvent[] themselves,"187
MDPs are a very attractive ingredient to add to the portfolio of service
providers, especially in light of "global capitalism,"' 188 most of which
positively influences an increase in MDP.
In addition to the role that capitalism plays, Japanese, North
American, and European corporations have increasingly become
stateless-using their multinational personalities to obtain their global
competitive ends. 189 They use their chameleon-like abilities to become
insiders when they operate outside of their main place of operation. As
one CEO put it, "when we go to Brussels, we're member states of the
EEC and when we go to Washington we're an American company
too." 19° Whenever companies need to, they wrap themselves up in the
nation of choice to get support for tax breaks, research subsidies, or
governmental representation in negotiations affecting their marketing
plans. Through this process, stateless corporations are effectively

182. Id.
183. J. Bradford De Long, The Promise and Perils of the New Economy, XXI1-4 THE WILSON
QUARTERLY 14, 26 (1998).
184. Id. at 26.
185. John Stopford, Think Again-Multinational Corporations,FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter
1998-99, at 12, 22.
186. Id. at 13 (discussing trends in multinationals growth and the perception that they are
large, footloose, and exploitative).
187. Id. at 12.
188. See SAARI, supra note 123, at 79 (articulating that in the 21st century capitalism will be
dominated by a spectrum of Capitalisms, and that several specifically drive the move toward
MDP, including: Investor Capitalism; Corporate Capitalism; Global Capitalism; Twenty-firstcentury Capitalism; and Free Market Capitalism).
189. Clark, supra note 132, at 299.
190. Id.
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transforming nation-states to suit their interests. 19 1 MDP entities are
sure to adopt this pattern because the market is also driving them, and it
has a track record for successfully working to the stockholders' and
owners' advantages.
More specifically, internationalization of the legal practice is also a
factor in the drive toward MDP. American firms are competing in
London with British firms, because American firms, at this juncture,
wield major "wallet power."' 192 As a result of this "wallet power,"
international flexibility in the MDP is driving U.S. firms toward the
international MDP model and international firms are gravitating to U.S.
firms based on the readily available capital to support international
MDPs. Another source of general competition for the legal profession
and the more aggressive approach toward MDP "is the global
accounting giants, who see law as a logical and profitable area for
expansion." 193 Major domestic and international law firm mergers are
also on the rise; for example, London's Clifford Chance, New York's
Rogers and Wells, and the German firm of Punder Volhard Weber and
Axster merged on January 1, 2000, to form the world's largest single
law firm. 194 These large mergers are, no doubt, the forerunners to MDP
firms, which will evolve into mega-merged MDP firms. General
mergers and MDPs are part of what industry professionals see as
necessitated by marketplace and client dictates, 195 which work to
accelerate the drive toward MDP. As international forces such as
mergers, transactional, and transnational cooperation continue to
develop, doubtless, the notion that MDP is the answer will become
more prevalent. Corporate expansion is an unavoidable force, but does
not have to dictate the legal profession's next step in its development.
V. CONCLUSION

In debating and evaluating whether to sanction MDP, the ABA
should realize that an alternative currently exists that allows law firms,
perhaps not under the MDP form, to accomplish the same goals that

191. Id.
192. Linda Tsang, Friendly Rivals, A.B.A. J., May 2000, at 52, 54.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.; MultidisciplinaryPractice Report, supra note 1 (stating that the United States and
foreign representatives of four of the Big Five testified before the Commission that the most
efficient way to provide a seamless web of services to clients was through an integrated services
entity); Commission Report, Witnesses at ABA Commission on MDP Hearings, app. B (many
foreign professional, both lawyers and accountants testified: French, English, Welsh, Spaniards,
et al.).
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most espouse as the driving force for the adoption of the MDP model.
For example, one approach might be "client teaming," where
interdisciplinary "client teams" will become an organizational form of
choice for many large law firms as a way to more effectively meet the
diversified needs of particular clients. Traditionally, firms organize
themselves by practice groups, which are formed around industries such
as health-care, technology, and entertainment.
Next is the client-centered approach, where the law firms build a
strategic client team around an individual client. The team is formed
early in the relationship and comprises specialty lawyers (who are also
accountants) key to the client's long-term needs. This "connectivity"
with clients will become an increasingly popular approach to servicing
emerging growth companies that need the integration of multiple
specialties (e.g., an accountant who could serve a dual function) and, as
they move quickly, lawyers that are already highly educated about
business. "The result is improved, individualized legal service
[regulated by traditional legal standards] for the client and a more
satisfying way to practice law for lawyers, who view themselves as
business partners with the client."' 196 Thus, attorneys will continue to
have the independence and accountability needed to protect the public
and effectively execute their professional goals. This example of how
interdisciplinary "client teams" work within the current legal structure is
a viable alternative to MDP and is also indicative of how the current
system has the tools to competently discharge the practice of law
without joining the "lodge."
In short, as this paper has highlighted, "[w]hile accountants may be
cheaper and faster, they cannot offer broad-ranging confidentiality or
loyalty to their clients and the protections those duties try to
guarantee."' 197 If nonlawyers are allowed to practice law, no regulatory
system is in place to ensure independence and confidentiality, but, most
importantly, nothing would ensure that competent delivery of legal
services is at the forefront of what the profession is undertaking.
Further, some states even prohibit lawyers from performing certain
multistate transactions in their efforts to ensure that their citizenry is
sufficiently protected. Ultimately, even if we determine that safeguards
could be developed and implemented in an attempt to protect the public,
it is unlikely these safeguards would be sufficient to truly protect the
consumer's right to sufficient legal services. In other words, accepting
MDP, even if sanctioned by many, would undermine the integrity of the
196. Boone & Conner, supra note 35, at 24.
197. Gibeaut, supra note 9, at 47.
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legal profession. On balance, even though MDP has its support, as the
ABA has noted "[w]e must consider the potential impact of MDP on
some of our treasured core values."' 198 "Lawyer independence,
avoidance of conflicts of interest, zealous representation, maintenance
of client confidences and the attorney-client privilege may be
irreparably affected by the MDP structure." 199 With this caveat,
attorneys should not accept MDP if we are committed to our "core
values."

198. William G. Paul, To MDP or Not to MDP, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1999, at 6 (President's
Message) (commenting on the MDP debate and the deliberative process that lawyers use in
making controversial decisions); see Multidisciplinary Practice Report, supra note I (discussing
the ethical and regulatory barriers to MDPs, the Report stated that "the paucity of enforcement
actions may be partially attributed to the inability of the courts and regulatory authorities to
formulate [and enforce the unauthorized practice of law] a workable definition of the practice of
law .... ).
199. Paul, supra note 198, at 6.

